The proposed Digital Infrastructure Act would impose a $1 million daily penalty for continuing violations of restrictions on high-risk carriers in American data centers, according to a November 19 Fox News report on Rep. Pat Harrigan’s plan.
The North Carolina Republican is targeting a gap between restrictions on telecommunications services and companies’ remaining physical connections inside U.S. infrastructure. The measure is a legislative proposal, rather than an enacted fine that authorities can already collect under this plan.
The announcement comes amid scrutiny of recent technology disruptions. Those events do not, by themselves, establish foreign interference, and official findings about individual incidents must be distinguished from broader concerns about network security.
What the Digital Infrastructure Act would target
Fox reported that the proposal would bar high-risk carriers from owning or operating U.S. data centers or providing cloud services to Americans. Its account also described coverage extending to affiliates and American venture partners, alongside a temporary exception requiring approval from U.S. communications officials.
Those provisions remain attributed to the published report. A verified bill number, complete legislative text and congressional action record were not located in the material reviewed for this article. The exact statutory definitions and implementation procedures therefore remain unconfirmed here.
That distinction is important for companies assessing the Digital Infrastructure Act. The reported daily penalty describes the proposed enforcement mechanism; it does not establish that every Chinese company with an American technology customer would automatically face a fine.
A House investigation documented the infrastructure gap
The underlying concern predates this week’s outages. In August, a bipartisan House Select Committee on China investigation examined the U.S. operations of China Telecom, China Mobile and China Unicom after federal restrictions on their telecommunications authorizations.
The committee’s published findings said the companies retained infrastructure and network relationships despite those actions. It argued that limiting services the carriers could sell had not eliminated their equipment or other connections.
In its full report, the committee described retained hardware, interconnection agreements and data-center footholds. It also raised concerns about operational ties between U.S. subsidiaries and their overseas parent companies.
These are findings and risk assessments from a congressional investigation. They should not be read as proof that a particular company’s remaining equipment caused any of the November service interruptions.
The committee recommended statutory authority over retained infrastructure, stronger oversight of interconnection and resources for internet routing security. Its recommendations illustrate why lawmakers are discussing additional powers beyond existing licensing decisions.
Earlier telecom restrictions have a separate legal history
The Justice Department’s public record of telecom actions confirms that the federal government had already acted against several carriers before Harrigan’s proposal.
It records the recommendation to revoke China Telecom’s Section 214 authorization and the FCC’s subsequent revocation. It also records the denial of China Mobile’s application and the revocation of China Unicom’s authorization.
The department further notes that a federal appeals court denied China Telecom’s challenge to its revocation in December 2022. Separately, it documents executive-branch determinations concerning China Unicom, Pacific Networks and ComNet that preceded additions to the FCC’s Covered List.
Those actions concern established regulatory decisions. They provide background for the Digital Infrastructure Act, but do not substitute for the text or passage of a new law governing data-center operations.
Recent outages do not establish a Chinese cyberattack
The FAA’s November 15 questions and answers said it had no indication that the November 13 ground stop resulted from a cyberattack or an outside malicious actor.
Its explanation said some radio frequencies and radar feeds remained available throughout the disruption to support aircraft.
The agency described telecommunications instability and an investigation involving equipment at sites in Arkansas and Texas. Hourly Times previously covered the FAA equipment investigation and subsequent funding debate.
For the proposed legislation, the next verifiable milestones would be publication of its text and a formal congressional record. Until then, the reported enforcement plan and the established history of telecom restrictions should remain clearly separated.
